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1 Introduction
Optimal growth theory is useful in qualitatively characterizing simple dynami-
cal systems and in providing constructive methods for the quantitative analysis
of the solutions to more complex ones. The usefulness is, for some purposes,
enhanced because of the intimate connections between optimal growth theories
and their equilibrium counterparts. In a decentralized economy, we seek knowl-
edge about the time paths of the various prices for goods and production factors
as well as the distribution of income and wealth. Dynamic optimization tech-
niques used extensively in growth theory facilitate the study of the evolution of
those economic aggregates.
A major concern in the area of optimal growth has been the analysis of the
short-run and asymptotic behavior of optimal solutions. At issue are questions
concerning the existence and asymptotic stability of optimal programs with re-
spect to the stationary optimal stock (turnpike results) as well as the possibility
of cyclical or even chaotic behavior.
One-sector representative agent models, in which utility is derived solely
from consumption have been studied extensively in the literature under a variety
of diﬀerent technological specifications. A well known property of these models
is the monotonicity of the optimal capital path. This property is persistent even
when technology has increasing returns (see Dechert and Nishimura (1983)).
Thus, it is often suggested that one-sector models exhibit simple dynamics.
Becker and Foias (1987) show that agents’ heterogeneity plays a crucial role
to the appearance of nonmonotonic dynamics in a single-sector model. Studying
a specific economy with incomplete markets as represented by borrowing con-
straints, they demonstrate that deterministic cycles with period 2 may occur.
In Becker and Foias (1994) they discuss in more detail the issue of equilibrium
cycles and their construction using bifurcation analysis. Their work has been
further elaborated by Sorger (1994).
In a complete market model, Le Van and Vailakis (2003) have also shown
that the monotonicity property does not carry over if one permits many con-
sumers, each with a diﬀerent discount factor. The model does not exhibit
cyclical behavior. The convergence of the optimal capital sequence to a partic-
ular stock ks is still true, but that stock is not itself a steady state. This result
implies that the optimal capital sequence initiated at k0 = ks converges to it
in the long-run, but it is not a constant sequence. Hence, the resulting optimal
capital sequence cannot be monotonic. The model exhibits the twisted turnpike
property (see Mitra (1979), Becker (2005)): the optimal capital accumulation
paths starting from diﬀerent initial capital stocks converge to each other, or
come together, in the limit but this limit is not itself an optimal stationary pro-
gram. This is a fundamental property of the heterogeneous agent model and it
2
shows one way in which this model diﬀers significantly from its representative
agent counterpart.
In this paper we examine whether and under which conditions similar prop-
erties can be established when the heterogeneous-agents Ramsey model studied
in Le Van-Vailakis is extended to include an endogenous non-reproducible factor
such as labor.
The analysis in Le Van and Vailakis (2003) is carried out by exploiting
the so called reduced form model associated with the welfare maximization
problem. The presence of heterogeneous discount factors turns out the reduced-
form problem to be nonstationary, making the issue of convergence of optimal
paths a nontrivial one. Their argument exploits the fact that the indirect utility
function Vt associated with the reduced form model is C2 in the interior of a
set D describing feasible activities in period t. This allows them to show that
Vt is supermodular. The supermodularity of Vt then implies that the stationary
problem involving the agents with a discount factor equal to the maximum one,
has a unique stable steady state ks. Exploiting additional properties of optimal
paths, they subsequently show that the optimal capital sequence associated
with the initial problem converges to ks.
Several complications arise by applying a similar method of proof in the
presence of elastic labor supply. The problems arise largely from the fact that
one cannot exclude the existence of corner solutions in the welfare maximization
problem. More precisely, one cannot ensure that all consumers supply labor at
any period. As a consequence, the indirect utility function Vt associated with
the reduced form model is not necessarily C2 in the interior of D. Hence, one
cannot use the diﬀerentiable characterization of supermodilarity. To overcome
the problem and establish the supermodularity of Vt, we employ an alterna-
tive argument based on a iterative procedure in which a sequence of functions,
(V nt )n, are shown to be supermodular and to be converging to the function Vt.
Other issues are associated with the properties of optimal paths. Several
proofs in Le Van-Vailakis (2003) cannot be carried out due to the presence of
elastic labor supply. New and general arguments are given to establish the
validity of those properties.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model. In sec-
tion 3 we present its reduced-form counterpart and establish some preliminary
results. Section 4 contains our basic results.
2 The model
We consider an intertemporal one-sector model with m ≥ 1 consumers and one
firm. At each period, individuals consume a quantity ci,t, and decide how to
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divide the available time, normalized at 1, between leisure activities li,t, and
work Li,t. Preferences are represented by a functional that takes the usual
additively separable form:
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t),
where ui denotes the instantaneous utility function and βi ∈ (0, 1) is the dis-
count factor.
The initial endowment of capital, the single reproducible factor in the econ-
omy, is denoted by k0 ≥ 0. Technology is described by a gross production
function F . Capital evolves according to:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It,
where It is gross investment and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation for capital.
At each period, the economy’s resource constraints, restricting the allocation
of income and time, are:
mX
i=1
ci,t + It ≤ F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt,
mX
i=1
Li,t = Lt. (1)
We next specify a first set of assumptions imposed on preferences and produc-
tion technology. The assumptions on period utility function ui : R2+ → R are
as follows:
Assumption U1: ui is continuous, strictly concave, increasing in R2+ and
strictly increasing in R2++.
Assumption U2: ui(0, 0) = 0.
Assumption U3: ui is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in R2++ with partial
derivatives that satisfy the Inada conditions: limc→0 uic(c, l) = +∞, ∀l > 0 and
liml→0 uil(c, l) = +∞, ∀c > 0.
Assumption U4: uicl has a constant sign and the second partial derivatives
satisfy the following condition:
uicc
uic
≤ u
i
cl
uil
.
The assumptions on the production function F : R2+ → R+ are as follows:
Assumption F1: F is continuous, concave, increasing in R2+ and strictly
increasing in R2++.
Assumption F2: F (0, L) = F (k, 0) = 0.
Assumption F3: F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in R2++ with partial
derivatives that satisfy: limk→0 Fk(k, 1) ≥ 1mini βi −(1−δ), limk→+∞ Fk(k,m) =
0 and limL→0 FL(k, L) = +∞, ∀k > 0.
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Assumption F4: FkL is nonnegative.
We conclude this section by introducing some notation.
Let f(kt, Lt) = F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt. Observe that under the previous assump-
tions, limk→0 fk(k, 1) ≥ 1mini βi , limk→+∞ fk(k,m) < 1 and limL→0 fL(k, L) =
+∞. Consider the set of feasible capital sequences:
Π(k0) = {k ∈ (R+)∞: 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t} .
Let ct = (c1,t, c2,t, ..., cm,t) and lt = (l1,t, l2,t, ..., lm,t) denote the m−vectors
of consumption-leisure allocations at date t. The nonnegative consumption,
leisure, labor sequences (c, l,L) = (ct, lt, Lt)∞t=0 is said to be feasible from k0 ≥ 0,
if there exists a sequence k ∈ Π(k0) such that (c, l,L,k) satisfy the economy’s
resource constraint (1) together with the individual time constraint li,t+Li,t ≤ 1.
The set of feasible from k0 consumption, leisure-labor allocations is denoted by
Σ(k0).
3 Planner’s Problem
The planner’s welfare function is taken to be a weighted function of the un-
derlying households’ intertemporal functions. Let ∆ =
½
λ ∈ Rm+ |
mP
i=1
λi = 1
¾
.
Given nonnegative welfare weights λ ∈ ∆ the social planner maximizes:
max
mX
i=1
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t) (P )
s.t.
mX
i=1
ci,t + kt+1 ≤ f(kt,
mX
i=1
Li,t),∀t
ci,t ≥ 0, li,t ≥ 0, Li,t ≥ 0, li,t + Li,t ≤ 1, ∀i,∀t
kt ≥ 0, ∀t and k0 given.
It is well known that any Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be represented as the
solution to problem (P ). In other words, by varying the welfare weights it is
possible to trace the economy’s utility possibility frontier. This procedure can
also be used to prove the existence of a price system that support Pareto-optima
and characterize competitive equilibria as a set of welfare weights such that the
associated transfer payments are zero (Negishi’s approach).
3.1 Preliminary results
Since u and F are assumed to be strictly increasing, L can be dropped from
the list of planner’s choices. Consider the technology set D:
D =
©
(k, y) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)
ª
,
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and define the correspondence Γ :
(k, y) ∈ D→
(
(ci, li)i :
mX
i=1
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
mX
i=1
li), ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i
)
.
Given λ ∈ ∆, let I = (i | λi > 0}, β = max{βi | i ∈ I}, I1 = {i ∈ I | βi = β}
and I2 = {i ∈ I | βi < β}. Let ζ = (ζi)i∈I where ζi = 1, ∀i ∈ I1 and ζi ∈ [0, 1],
∀i ∈ I2. Given (k, y) ∈ D, let
V (λ, ζ, k, y) = max
⎡
⎣X
i∈I1
λiu
i(ci, li) +
X
i∈I2
λiζiu
i(ci, li)
⎤
⎦
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I
Let also
(ci(ζ, k, y), li(ζ, k, y))i∈I = argmax
(X
i∈I
λiζiu
i(ci, li), (ci, li)i∈I ∈ Γ(k, y)
)
Let ζi = 1, ∀i ∈ I1 and ζi =
βi
β , ∀i ∈ I2. For simplicity assume that I1 =
{1, ...,#I1}. In this case, for any t ≥ 0, we use the notation ζt = (1, ..., 1, (ζti)i∈I2).
We subsequently introduce the time-dependent function Vt:
Vt(λ, k, y) = V (λ, ζ
t, k, y)
= max
⎡
⎣X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li) +
X
i∈I2
λiζtiu
i(ci, li)
⎤
⎦
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I
Let (c∗i , l
∗
i )i∈I = (ci(ζ
t, k, y), li(ζt, k, y))i∈I denote the solution to this problem.
Consider the following intertemporal problem:
max
∞X
t=0
βtV (λ, ζt, kt, kt+1) (Q)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
The following proposition shows that problems (P ) and (Q) are equivalent.
More precisely we have:
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Proposition 1 Let k0 ≥ 0 be given. Under assumptions U1, F1:
i) If ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) is a solution to problem (P ), then k∗ is a solution to
problem (Q).
ii) If k∗ is a solution to problem (Q), then there exists (c∗i , l
∗
i )i such that
((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) is a solution to problem (P ).
Proof : It is easy.
Lemma 1 Under assumptions U1-U2, F1-F2, Γ is upper hemicontinuous on
D and continuous at any (k, y) ∈ D with k > 0.
Proof : It is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 proven below (refer to Remark
2).
Remark 1 To see why lower hemicontinuity fails when k = 0 observe that,
under assumption F2, for k = 0 we have D = {(0, 0)} and
Γ(0, 0) = {(ci, li)i : ci = 0 and li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i}.
Choose (ci, li)i ∈ Γ(0, 0) such that ci = 0 and li > 0 for some i. Consider next a
sequence (kn, yn) such that yn = f(kn,m) and (kn, yn)→ (0, 0). Note that there
is no sequence (cni , l
n
i )i such that (c
n
i , l
n
i )i ∈ Γ(kn, yn) and (cni , lni )i → (ci, li)i.
Proposition 2 Assume U1-U3, F1-U3. Then V : (λ, ζ, k, y) ∈ ∆×[0, 1]#I2×
D→ R+ is:
i) increasing in k, decreasing in y and strictly concave in (k, y)
ii) upper semicontinuous and continuous at any (ζ, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]#I2×D with
k > 0.
iii) The functions ci : [0, 1]#I2 × intD→ R+ and li : [0, 1]#I2 × intD→ R+
are continuous.
Let (k, y) ∈ intD and c∗ = (ci(ζt, k, y))i∈I , l∗ = (li(ζt, k, y))i∈I denote the
solution to the static maximization problem.
iv) If λi = 0, then c∗i = 0 and l
∗
i = 0. If i ∈ I, then c∗i > 0 and l∗i > 0. In
addition, there exists i ∈ I such that l∗i < 1.
v) Vt is diﬀerentiable at any (k, y) ∈ intD with partial derivatives given by:
∂Vt(λ, k, y)
∂k
= µtfk(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )
∂Vt(λ, k, y)
∂y
= −µt
where µt = λi
³
βi
β
´t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i ), ∀i.
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Proof : (i) is standard. (ii) and (iii) follow from the Maximum Theorem.
(iv) It is obvious that λi = 0 implies c∗i = 0, l
∗
i = 0. Since (k, y) ∈ intD,
there exists ε > 0 such that 0 < y + ε < f(k,m − ε). By letting ci = ε#I ,
li = ε#I , ∀i ∈ I, the Slater condition is satisfied. Hence, there exists Lagrange
multipliers µt(ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R+ associated with the constraint
P
i ci+y ≤ f(k,m−P
i∈I li) and ηi,t(ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R+ associated with the constraints li ≤ 1 such that
(c∗, l∗, µt, (ηi,t)i∈I) maximizes the associated Lagrangian :
L =
X
i∈I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)− µt
"X
i∈I
ci + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
#
−
X
i∈I
ηi,t(li − 1).
That c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i > 0, ∀i ∈ I is a consequence of the Inada conditions imposed
on period utilities. The existence of some i ∈ I with l∗i < 1 is a consequence of
the limiting conditions imposed on technology. (v) follows from Corollary 7.3.1
in Florenzano, Le Van and Gourdel (2001).
Since fk(∞,m) < 1, there exists some k such that f(k,m) = k. It is easy
to show that k ∈ Π(k0) implies kt ≤ A(k0) = max{k0, k}. This in turn implies
that Π(k0) is included in a compact set for the product topology. Since f is
continuous, the set Π(k0) is closed for the product topology, and therefore, is
compact in this topology. Define next the function U : R+ ×Π(k0)→ R+ :
U(k0,k) =
∞X
t=0
βtV (λ, ζt, kt, kt+1).
We have the following result.
Lemma 2 i) The correspondence Π is continuous for the product topology.
ii) U(k0, ·) is upper semicontinuous on Π(k0) for the product topology.
Proof : Refer to Le Van and Morhaim (2002, Lemma 2, Proposition 2).
It follows that problem (Q) is equivalent to the maximization of an upper
semicontinuous function over a compact set, and therefore it admits a solution.
Observe also that the strict concavity of Vt implies that the solution is unique.
Proposition 3 For all k0 ≥ 0, there is a unique optimal accumulation path.
3.2 Value function-Bellman equation-Optimal policy
One way to make any further analysis easier is to work with the value function.
Let ζ = (ζi)i∈I where ζi = 1, ∀i ∈ I1 and ζi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I2. Given T ≥ 0,
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define the function WT : (ζ, k0) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×R+ → R+ :
WT (ζ, k0) = W (ζ
T , k0)
= max
∞X
t=0
βtV (λ, ζT+t, kt, kt+1)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
It is obvious that when ζi = 1, ∀i ∈ I1 and ζi =
βi
β , ∀i ∈ I2, W0(ζ, k0) is the
value function associated with problem (Q). In infinite-horizon problems with
time-invariant period return functions (stationary problems) the value function
is a function of the initial state alone. In the above problem the period return
function is time-dependent, so the problem is a nonstationary one. In this case,
as the time index on W indicates, the value function is time-dependent.
Proposition 4 The value function W : (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×R+ → R+ is strictly
increasing, strictly concave, nonnegative with W (ζ, k) > 0 for k > 0, upper
semicontinuous and continuous when k > 0.
Proof : It follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
The next proposition states formally what is known as the Principle of
Optimality. It will help us characterize basic properties of optimal paths.
Proposition 5 The value function solves the Bellman equation, i.e.
∀k0 ≥ 0, W (ζ0, k0) = max{V (λ, ζ0, k0, k1) + βW (ζ, k1) : 0 ≤ k1 ≤ f(k0,m)}
and for all k0 ≥ 0, a feasible path k is optimal, if and only if,
W (ζt, kt) = V (λ, ζt, kt, kt+1) + βW (ζt+1, kt+1)
holds for all t.
We next define the optimal policy function ϕT : (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × R+ →
R+ :
ϕT (ζ, k) = ϕ(ζ
T , k) = argmax
©
V (λ, ζT , k, y) + βW (ζT+1, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)
ª
.
When ζi = 1, ∀i ∈ I1 and ζi =
βi
β , ∀i ∈ I2, it follows that ∀t ≥ 1 :
k∗t = ϕ(ζ
t−1, k∗t−1) = ϕ(ζ
t−1, ϕ(ζt−2, k∗t−2)) = ϕ(ζ
t−1, ϕ(ζt−2, ..., ϕ(ζ0, k0)...)).
For simplicity we write k∗t = ϕ
t(ζ0, k0).
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Lemma 3 Under assumptions U1-U2, F1-F2, ϕ is continuous in (ζ, k) ∈
[0, 1]#I2×R+, and therefore uniformly continuous in (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2×[0, A(k0)].
Proof : When k > 0, the continuity of ϕ follows from the Maximum Theorem.
When k = 0, feasibility implies that ϕ(ζ, k) = 0. Since f(0,m) = 0, for any
sequence (ζn, kn) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × R+ such that 0 ≤ ϕ(ζn, kn) ≤ f(kn,m) and
kn → 0, it follows that the sequence of maximizers converges to 0 as n→ +∞.
Consider next the problem involving the agents having a discount factor
equal to the maximum one. Let e0 = (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0). Define the time invariant
function bV : ∆×D→ R+:
V (λ,e0, k, y) = bV (λ, k, y)
= max
X
i∈I1
λiu
i(ci, li)
s.t.
X
i∈I1
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I1
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I1
The intertemporal problem associated with bV is now stationary, i.e.:
W (e0, k0) = cW (k0) ( bQ)
= max
∞X
t=0
βt bV (λ, kt, kt+1)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0, is given.
The optimal policy function for this problem is given by:
ϕ(e0, k0) = argmaxnbV (λ, k0, k1) + βcW (k1) : 0 ≤ k1 ≤ f(k0,m)o .
In this case, we write k∗t = ϕ(e0, k∗t−1) = ϕt(e0, k0).
Given k0 ≥ 0, for any feasible allocation ((ci, li)i,k) from k0, we have:
ui(ci,t, li,t) ≤ ui(f(A(k0),m), 1) = B(k0), ∀i.
This in turn implies that ∀t and ∀(k, y) ∈ D :
bV (λ, k, y) ≤ Vt(λ, k, y) ≤
⎛
⎝
max
i∈I2
βi
β
⎞
⎠
t
C(k0) + bV (λ, k, y),
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where C(k0) =
P
i∈I2
B(k0). Let ε > 0. Since
µmax
i∈I2
βi
β
¶
< 1, there exists T
independent of k0 such that:
bV (λ, k, y) ≤ VT+t(λ, k, y) ≤ εC(k0) + bV (λ, k, y), ∀t.
It follows that, ∀k0 ≥ 0, ∀T
0 ≥ T :
cW (k0) ≤WT 0(ζ, k0) ≤ εC(k0) 1
1− β +
cW (k0).
For any sequence (kt)∞t=0 feasible from k0, we have C(kt) ≤ C(k0). Hence, the
following inequalities also hold:
bV (λ, kt, kt+1) ≤ Vt(λ, kt, kt+1) ≤ εC(k0) + bV (λ, kt, kt+1), ∀t ≥ T,
cW (kt) ≤Wt(ζ, kt) ≤ εC(k0) 1
1− β +
cW (kt), ∀t ≥ T.
Consider now a feasible capital sequence (kt)∞t=0 starting from some k0 ≥ 0.
Using the previous results, for any subsequence (tn)∞n=1 such that ktn → k ≥ 0
and ktn+1 → k0 ≥ 0, we have:
lim
n→∞
Vtn(λ, ktn , ktn+1) = bV (λ, k, k0) and limn→∞Wtn(ζ, ktn) = cW (k).
4 Dynamic Equilibrium Properties
Claim (iv) in Proposition 2 shows that we cannot ensure that all consumers
supply labor at any period. As a consequence, we cannot exclude the existence
of corner solutions in the welfare maximization problem. This in turn implies
that we cannot use the diﬀerentiable characterization of supermodilarity for
the indirect utility function Vt. To overcome the problem and establish the
supermodularity of Vt, we employ an alternative argument based on a iterative
procedure in which a sequence of functions are shown to be supermodular and to
be converging to the function Vt. In what follows we deal with the construction
of such a sequence.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) and ν ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the production function ef defined as
follows: ef (ν, k, (li)i) = f(k,m− mX
i=1
li) + ν
mX
i=1
(1− li)α
Observe that limli→1 efli (ν, k, (li)i) = +∞. Let eD denote the technology set:
eD = n(k, y) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ y ≤ ef(ν, k,m)o ,
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and define the correspondence eΓ :
(ν, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]× eD→ ((ci, li)i : mX
i=1
ci + y ≤ ef (ν, k, (li)i) , ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1],∀i) .
Lemma 4 Under assumptions U1-U2, F1-F2, eΓ is upper hemicontinuous on
[0, 1]× eD and continuous at any (ν, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]× eD with k > 0.
Proof : Let (νn, kn, yn) ∈ D be a sequence that converges to some (ν, k, y) ∈
[0, 1] × eD. Let also (cni , lni )i be a sequence such that, (cni , lni )i ∈ eΓ(νn, kn, yn),
∀n. Since lni ∈ [0,m], cni ≤ ef(νn, kn,m) and kn → k, there exists a subsequence
(cni , l
n
i )i that converges to some (ci, li)i. Since
Pm
i=1 c
n
i + y
n ≤ ef (νn, kn, (lni )i) ,
∀n, we have (ci, li)i ∈ eΓ(ν, k, y).
We next show that eΓ is lower hemicontinuous at any (ν, k, y) with k > 0.
Let (νn, kn, yn) ∈ D be a sequence that converges to some (ν, k, y) with k > 0.
Take (ci, li)i ∈ eΓ(ν, k, y). We will show that there exists N ≥ 1 and a sequence
(cni , l
n
i )i such that (c
n
i , l
n
i )i ∈ Γ(νn, kn, yn), ∀n ≥ N and (cni , lni )i → (ci, li)i. We
consider three cases:
Case 1:
Pm
i=1 ci + y < ef (ν, k, (li)i) .
Observe that for n large enough,
Pm
i=1 ci + y
n < ef (νn, kn, (li)i) . In this case,
for any n, let cni = ci and l
n
i = li, ∀i.
Case 2:
Pm
i=1 ci + y = ef (ν, k, (li)i) and ci > 0 for i = {1, ..., J}.
Observe that there exists N such that yn < ef (νn, kn, (li)i) , ∀n ≥ N. Let
ξ = ef (ν, k, (li)i) − y and ξn = ef (νn, kn, (li)i) − yn, ∀n ≥ N. Since ξn → ξ,
N can be chosen such that ξn − ξ is suﬃciently small. For any n ≥ N, let
cni = ci +
ξn−ξ
J when i = 1, ..., J, c
n
i = 0 when i > J and l
n
i = li, ∀i.
Case 3:
Pm
i=1 ci + y = ef (ν, k, (li)i) and ci = 0, ∀i.
We have y = ef (ν, k, (li)i) . We consider three subcases.
1) Assume that li = 0, ∀i
In this case, y = ef (ν, k,m) . Let cn1 = ef (νn, kn,m) − yn, cni = 0, ∀i 6= 1 and
lni = 0, ∀i.
2) Assume that li ∈ (0, 1) for i = {1, ..., J}.
In this case, y = ef (ν, k, (li)i) < ef (ν, k,m) . Assume first that there exists a
subsequence (νn, kn, yn) such that yn ≤ ef (νn, kn, (li)i) . In this case, let cn1 =ef (νn, kn, (li)i)−yn, cni = 0, ∀i 6= 1 and lni = li, ∀i. Assume next that there exists
a subsequence (νn, kn, yn) such that yn > ef (νn, kn, (li)i) . Choose j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Define the functions ψ : [0, 1]→ R and, for any n, ψn : [0, 1]→ R:
ψ(ξ) = f(k, (1− ξ) +m− 1−
X
i6=j
li) + ν((1− ξ)α +
X
i6=j
(1− li)α)− y
ψn(ξ) = f(k
n, (1− ξ) +m− 1−
X
i6=j
li) + ν
n((1− ξ)α +
X
i6=j
(1− li)α)− yn.
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ψn(ξ) are decreasing in ξ. Observe that there exists N large enough such that
ψn(0) > 0, ∀n ≥ N. Note also that ψn(lj) = ef (νn, kn, (li)i)− yn < 0, ∀n ≥ N.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, for any n ≥ N, there exists ξn ∈ (0, lj)
such that ψn(ξ
n) = 0. For any n ≥ N, let lnj = ξn lni = li, ∀i 6= j and cni = 0,
∀i. Since the function ψ(ξ) is decreasing in ξ, it follows that lnj → lj .
3) Assume that li = 1, ∀i.
In this case, y = (1−δ)k. Assume first that there exits a subsequence (νn, kn, yn)
such that yn ≤ (1− δ)kn. In this case, let cn1 = (1− δ)kn − yn, cni = 0, ∀i 6= 1
and lni = 1, ∀i. Assume next that there exists a subsequence (kn, yn) such that
yn > (1− δ)kn. Choose j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Define the functions ψ : [0, 1] → R and,
for any n, ψn : [0, 1]→ R :
ψ(ξ) = f (k, (1− ξ)) + ν(1− ξ)α − y
ψn(ξ) = f (k
n, (1− ξ)) + νn(1− ξ)α − yn.
ψn(ξ) is decreasing in ξ. Observe that there exists N large enough such that
ψn(0) > 0, ∀n ≥ N. Note also that ψn(1) = (1− δ)kn−yn < 0, ∀n ≥ N. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, for any n ≥ N, there exists ξn ∈ (0, 1) such that
ψn(ξ
n) = 0. For any n ≥ N, let lnj = ξn lni = 1, ∀i 6= j and cni = 0, ∀i. Since the
function ψ(ξ) is decreasing in ξ, it follows that lnj → 1.
Remark 2 When ν = 0, ef (0, k, (li)i) = f (k,m−Pmi=1 li) and consequentlyeD = D and eΓ = Γ. Therefore, Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.
When ν ∈ (0, 1], D ⊂ eD and eΓ(D) ⊂ eΓ( eD).
Consider the indirect utility function eVt associated with the production functionef.
eVt(ν, λ, k, y) = eV (ν, λ, ζt, k, y)
= max
X
i∈I
λiζtui(ci, li)
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ ef (ν, k, (li)i∈I)
ci ≥ 0, 0 ≤ li ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I
We have the following result:
Lemma 5 eVt : (ν, λ, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]×∆× eD→ R+ is:
i) continuous at any (ν, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]× eD with k > 0.
ii) ∀(λ, k, y) ∈ ∆×D with k > 0:
lim
ν→0
eVt(ν, λ, k, y) = Vt(λ, k, y)
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iii) ∀(ν, λ, k, y) ∈ (0, 1]×∆× int eD :
∂ eVt(ν, λ, k, y)
∂k∂y
> 0.
That is, eVt is supermodular in the interior of eD.
Proof : (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 4 and the Maximum Theorem. The
proof of (iii) follows in several steps. We need the following two results.
Claim 1 Let
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 + b b · · · b b
b a2 + b · · · · · · b
· · · · · · ... . . . · · · ...
b b · · · aq−1 + b b
b b · · · b aq + b
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
with b < 0, ai < 0, ∀i = 1, ..., q.Then V is invertible and V −11 < 0.
Proof: It is easy to show that V is negative definite. Hence, V is invertible.
Let x =V −11. Since V x = 1, it follows that
aixi + b
qX
i=1
xi = 1, ∀i.
This in turn implies that x1 = aia1xi, ∀i 6= 1. If x1 ≥ 0, then xi ≥ 0, ∀i 6= 1 while
aixi + b
Pq
i=1 xi ≤ 0: a contradiction. Hence, xi < 0, ∀i = 1, ..., q.
Claim 2 Let A be a N ×N symmetric matrix. Given r = 1, ..., N, denote by
rA the r×N submatrix where only the r rows are retained and by rAr the r×r
submatrix where only the first r ≤ N rows and r ≤ N columns are retained.
Let B be an N × S submatrix with S ≤ N and rank equal to S. A is negative
definite on {z ∈ RN : Bz = 0} (i.e. zTAz < 0, ∀z ∈ RN with Bz = 0 and
z 6= 0) if and only if
(−1)r
¯¯¯¯
¯ rAr rB(rB)T 0
¯¯¯¯
¯ > 0
for r = S + 1, ..., N.
Proof: See Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Theorem M.D.3.
Let c∗ = (ci(ν, ζt, k, y))i∈I , l∗ = (li(ν, ζt, k, y))i∈I denote a solution for the
maximization problem. Since (k, y) ∈ int eD, there exists ε > 0 such that
0 < y + ε < ef(ν, k,m − ε). By letting ci = ε#I , li = ε#I , ∀i ∈ I, the Slater
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condition is satisfied. Hence there exists Lagrange multipliers µt(ν, ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R
associated with the constraint
P
i ci+y ≤ ef (ν, k, (li)i∈I) and ηi,t(ν, ζt, k, y) ∈ R
associated with the constraints li ≤ 1 such that (c∗, l∗, µt, (ηi,t)i∈I) maximizes
the associated Lagrangian :
L =
X
i∈I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)− µt
"X
i∈I
ci + y − ef (ν, k, (li)i)
#
−
X
i∈I
ηi,t(li − 1).
From the The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions we get:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt = 0,∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt
"
fL(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i ) + να(1− l∗i )α−1
#
− ηi,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I
µt ≥ 0, µt
"X
i∈I
c∗i + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )− ν
mX
i=1
(1− l∗i )α
#
= 0
ηi,t ≥ 0, ηi,t(l∗i − 1) = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Since ui is strictly increasing, ui(0, 0) = 0 and ui satisfies the Inada conditions,
it follows that c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i > 0, ∀i ∈ I. Therefore, µt > 0. Moreover, l∗i < 1,
ηi,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I, since l∗j = 1 for some j ∈ I implies ηj,t = +∞. The first-order
conditions become:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt = 0, ∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt
"
fL(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i ) + να(1− l∗i )α−1
#
= 0, ∀i ∈ I
X
i∈I
c∗i + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )− ν
mX
i=1
(1− l∗i )α = 0
Diﬀerentiating the above equations and rearranging we get:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uiccdc
∗
i + λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicldl
∗
i − dµt = 0, ∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicldc
∗
i +
"
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uill + µtfLL −
να(1− α)
(1− l∗i )2−α
#
dl∗i
−µt
⎡
⎣fkLdk − fLL
X
j∈I,j 6=i
dl∗j
⎤
⎦−
∙
fL +
να
(1− l∗i )1−a
¸
dµt = 0, ∀i ∈ I
X
i∈I
dc∗i + dy − fkdk + fL
X
i∈I
dl∗i +
X
i∈I
να
(1− l∗i )1−α
dl∗i = 0.
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Let
p = µtfLL, p1i =
να
(1− l∗i )1−α
, p2i = −µt
να(1− α)
(1− l∗i )2−α
, ∀i ∈ I.
and
ai = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicc, bi = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicl, ci = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uill + p2i.
With this notation the first order conditions can be written as follows:
aidc∗i + bidl
∗
i − dµt = 0, ∀i ∈ I (1)
bidc∗i + [ci + p]dl
∗
i + p
X
j∈I,j 6=i
dl∗j − (fL + p1i)dλt = µtfLkdk, ∀i ∈ I. (2)
X
i∈I
dc∗i +
X
i∈I
(fL + p1i)dl
∗
i = fkdk − dy. (3)
Denote q = #I. We can alternatively write these equations in a matrix form,
AX = X0, where:
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 0 · · · 0 b1 0 · · · 0 −1
0
...
. . .
... 0
...
. . .
... −1
0 0 · · · aq 0 0 · · · bq −1
b1 0 · · · 0 c1 + p p · · · p −fL − p11
0
...
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · bq p p · · · cq + p −fL − p1q
1 1 · · · 1 fL + p11 · · · fL + p1q 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
X =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dc∗1
...
dc∗q
dl∗1
...
dl∗q
dµt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, X0 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
µtfkLdk
...
µtfkLdk
fkdk − dy
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
In particular,
A =
Ã
M −dT
d 0
!
,
where:
M =
Ã
M11 M12
M21 M22
!
, d = (1, ..., 1, fL + p11, ..., fL + p1q)
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and
M11 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 aq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , M12 =M21 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
b1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · bq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
M22 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 + p p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p p · · · cq + p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
We show that A is invertible. Let bA be the matrix obtained from A by changing
the sign of the last column, i.e.
bA = Ã M dT
d 0
!
.
Observe that M22 = N1 +N2, where
N1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · cq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , N2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p p · · · p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Let z ={z1, ..., zq, ς1, ..., ςq) where z 6= 0. Since p2i < 0 and aici − b2i ≥ 0 (since
u is concave), it follows that
zTMy = zT
Ã
M11 M12
M21 N1
!
z+ zT
Ã
0 0
0 N2
!
z
=
X
i∈I
"
ai
µ
zi +
bi
ai
ς i
¶2
+
aici − b2i
ai
ς2i
#
+ p
ÃX
i∈I
ς i
!2
< 0,
Therefore, M is negative definite. Let
B =
Ã
dT
0
!
.
Since M is negative definite on {z ∈ R2q+1 : Bz = 0}, (i.e. zTMz < 0,
∀z ∈ R2q+1 with Bz = 0 and z 6= 0), it follows from claim 2 that:
(−1)2q det
Ã
2qM2q 2qB
(2qB)T 0
!
= (−1)2q| bA| > 0 or | bA| > 0.
Since |A| = −| bA| < 0 the matrix A is invertible. By the Implicit Function
Theorem, ci(ν, ζt, k, y), li(ν, ζt, k, y) and µt(ν, ζ
t, k, y) are C1 in a neighborhood
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of (k, y) ∈ int eD. The Envelope Theorem then implies:
∂ eVt(ν, λ, k, y)
∂k
= µtfk(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )
∂ eVt(ν, λ, k, y)
∂y
= −µt.
By equations (1),(2),(3) we obtain that:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
µ
fL + p11 −
b1
a1
, .., fL + p1q −
bq
aq
¶
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
fL + p11 − b1a1
...
fL + p1q − bqaq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎦+
qX
i=1
1
ai
dµt
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣−µtfLk
µ
fL + p11 −
b1
a1
, .., fL + p1q −
bq
aq
¶
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ fk
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ dk − dy,
with
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 − b
2
1
a1
+ p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p · · · cq − b
2
q
aq
+ p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Observe that the matrix V satisfies the hypothesis of claim 1. Therefore, V −1
exists and
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ <
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
From the first-order conditions we have:
fL + p1i =
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )
, ∀i.
Given assumption U4 we also have:
fL + p1i −
bi
ai
=
uil
uic
− u
i
cl
uicc
=
uil
uicc
µ
uicc
uic
− u
i
cl
uil
¶
≥ 0.
It follows that:
∂µt
∂k
< 0,
and in particular
∂2 eVt(ν, λ, k, y)
∂k∂y
= −∂µt
∂k
> 0, ∀(k, y) ∈ int eD.
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Equipped with the result established in the last proposition we return to
the study of problem (Q). We have the following result.
Proposition 6 i) Vt is supermodular in the interior of D, i.e.
∀(k, y), (k0, y0) ∈ intD :
Vt(λ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + Vt(λ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0)) ≥ Vt(λ, k, y) + Vt(λ, k0, y0).
ii) The policy function ϕ(e0, k) is non-decreasing in k. As a consequence,
the optimal capital path associated with problem bQ is monotonic. Moreover, if
k0 ≤ k00 and k∗,k0 are the optimal paths starting respectively from k0 and k00,
then k∗t ≤ k0t, ∀t.
Proof : i) Note that (k, y) ∈ intD implies that 0 < y < ef (ν, k,m) , ∀ν ∈ [0, 1].
From Lemma 5, it follows that ∀(k, y), (k0, y0) ∈ intD :eVt(ν, λ, (k, y)∨ (k0, y0))+ eVt(ν, λ, (k, y)∧ (k0, y0)) ≥ eVt(ν, λ, k, y)+ eVt(ν, λ, k0, y0).
Letting ν → 0 and taking the limits of both sides we get:
Vt(λ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + Vt(λ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0)) ≥ Vt(λ, k, y) + Vt(λ, k0, y0).
That is, Vt is supermodular on intD.
ii) Recall that problem bQ is stationary. Assume that k0 < k00. If k0 = 0,
then ϕ(e0, k0) = 0, while ϕ(e0, k00) > 0. Let k0 > 0, but assume the contrary, i.e.
ϕ(e0, k0) > ϕ(e0, k00). We consider two cases:
Case 1: Assume that ϕ(e0, k0) < fk0,m).
Observe that
0 < ϕ(e0, k00) < f(k0,m)
0 < ϕ(e0, k0) < f(k00,m).
Therefore, ϕ(e0, k00) is feasible from k0 and ϕ(e0, k0) is feasible from k00. Since bV
is supermodular in the interior of D, the claim follows directly (see Majumdar
et al. (2000), Chap. 2, Proposition 5.2).
Case 2: Assume that ϕ(e0, k0) = f(k0,m).
We have that 0 < ϕ(e0, k00) < f(k00,m). The continuity of ϕ implies that for
any k < k
0
0 with k suﬃciently close to k
0
0, we have 0 < ϕ(e0, k) < f(k,m).
Let k1 ∈ [k0, k00) be the first element, such that, ϕ(e0, k1) = f(k1,m). For any
k ∈ (k1, k00], we have 0 < ϕ(e0, k) < f(k,m) and ϕ(e0, k) ≤ ϕ(e0, k00) (recall case
1). It follows that
ϕ(e0, k00) ≥ ϕ(e0, k1) = f(k1,m) ≥ f(k0,m) = ϕ(e0, k0).
We conclude the proof.
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Lemma 6 Let k∗ denote the solution to problem (Q). Under assumptions U1-
U4, F1-F4, if k0 > 0, then k∗t > 0, ∀t.
Proof : See Appendix.
We need to impose some additional structure on preferences and production
technology.
Assumption U5: For any period utility function ui that satisfies i) ui(c, 0) =
ui(0, l) = 0, ∀c ≥ 0, l ≥ 0 and ii) uicl(c, l) > 0, ∀(c, l) ∈ R2++, we additionally
require uic(x, x) and u
i
l(x, x) to be non-increasing in x.
Assumption F5: F is assumed to be homogeneous of degree a ∈ (0, 1], i.e.
F (k, L) = LaF
¡
k
L , 1
¢
.
As the following lemma shows, these additional assumptions are suﬃcient
to exclude convergence to zero.
Lemma 7 Let k0 > 0. If k∗ denotes the optimal path starting from k0, then k∗t
cannot converge to zero.
Proof : See Appendix.
Consider next the problem involving the agents with a discount factor equal
to the maximum one (i.e. the agents that belong to the set I1).
Proposition 7 Let k0 > 0 and ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i∈I1 ,k
∗) denote the solution to the
Pareto-optimum problem involving only agents in I1. There exists ((csi , l
s
i )i∈I1 ,
ks) such that
P
i∈I1 c
s
i + k
s = f
¡
ks,m−
P
i∈I1 l
s
i
¢
, fk
¡
ks,m−
P
i∈I1 l
s
i
¢
= 1β ,
and k∗t → ks, c∗i,t → csi , l∗i,t → lsi , ∀i ∈ I1.
Proof : From Proposition 6(ii) we know that the optimal capital sequence k∗
is bounded and monotonic. In addition Lemma 7 implies that k∗t → ks > 0. By
the principle of optimality we have:cW (k∗t ) = bV (λ, k∗t , k∗t+1) + βcW (k0)(k∗t+1),∀t ≥ 0.
Taking the limits as t→ +∞ we obtain:cW (ks) = bV (λ, ks, ks) + βcW (ks).
It follows that ks is a steady state. By Proposition 1 there exists (csi , l
s
i )i∈I1
associated with ks that solve:bV (λ, ks, ks) = maxX
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li)
s.t.
X
i∈I1
ci + ks ≤ f(ks,m−
X
i∈I1
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ I1
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Observe that ks < f (ks,m) . If not, then:X
i∈I1
csi = 0 and
X
i∈I1
lsi = 1.
In this case, bV (λ, ks, ks) = 0: a contradiction since by Proposition 4 ks > 0
implies cW (ks) > 0.
Hence, 0 < ks < f(ks,m). From Proposition 2(iv) ci(ks, ks) > 0 and
li(ks, ks) > 0, ∀i ∈ I1. Moreover, since ci(k∗t , k∗t+1) and li(k∗t , k∗t+1) are continu-
ous functions and k∗t → ks we have:
ci(k∗t , k
∗
t+1)→ ci(ks, ks), li(k∗t , k∗t+1)→ lsi (ks, ks).
Since k∗t → ks > 0, there exists T such that 0 < k∗t+1 < f(k∗t ,m) ∀t ≥ T.
Thus, for any t ≥ T Euler equation holds, i.e.
uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) = βu
i
c(c
∗
i,t+1, l
∗
i,t+1)fk(k
∗
t+1,m−
X
i∈I1
l∗i,t+1)
Taking the limits we get:
βfk(k
s,m−
X
i∈I1
lsi ) = 1.
Lemma 8 Let a ∈ (0, k]. Then, ∀ε > 0, ∃T (a, ε), such that, ∀k ≥ a, ∀t ≥
T (a, ε) : ¯¯¯
ϕt(e0, k)− ks ¯¯¯ < ε.
Proof : Let ε > 0 and k ≥ a. Given Proposition 7, ∃T (k, ε) such that ∀t ≥
T (k, ε) : ¯¯¯
ϕt(e0, k)− ks ¯¯¯ < ε.
Since ϕt is continuous, there exists a neighborhood v(k) of k, such that, ∀k0 ∈
v(k) we have: ¯¯¯
ϕT (k,ε)(e0, k0)− ks ¯¯¯ < ε.
Assume that k < ks. Since (ϕt(0, k))t is non-decreasing, ∀k0 ∈ v(k), ∀t ≥
T (k, ε): ¯¯¯
ϕt(e0, k0)− ks ¯¯¯ = ks − ϕt(e0, k0)
≤ ks − ϕT (k,ε)(e0, k0)
< ε.
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When k ≥ ks the argument is similar. Now consider a finite covering (v(kj))nj=1
of [a, k] and let T (a, ε) = maxj{T (kj , ε)}.
We now return to the initial problem involving all agents. The following
Proposition shows that the optimal capital sequence is bounded away from
zero.
Proposition 8 For any k0 > 0 and k∗ optimal from k0, there exists γ > 0
such that k∗t ≥ γ, ∀t.
Proof : Lemma 7 implies that there exists a ∈ (0, ks) and a subsequence
(k∗Tn)n∈N such that k
∗
Tn ≥ a, ∀n ∈ N. Choose ε > 0 such that a − ε > 0
and ks − 2ε > a. Let T (a, ε) be as in Lemma 8. It follows that:¯¯¯
ϕT (a,ε)(e0, k∗Tn)− ks ¯¯¯ < ε, ∀n ∈ N.
Since ϕ is uniformly continuous, ∃n large enough, such that:¯¯¯
ϕ(ζTn , k∗Tn)− ϕ(e0, k∗Tn)¯¯¯ < ε.
In particular uniform continuity of ϕt implies that ∀t = 1, ..., T (a, ε) :¯¯¯
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn)− ϕ
t(e0, k∗Tn)¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯
ϕ(ζTn+t−1, ϕ(ζTn+t−2, ..., ϕ(ζTn , k∗Tn)...))− ϕ(e0, k∗Tn+t)¯¯¯ < ε.
Observe that k∗Tk ≥ a implies ϕ
t(e0, k∗Tn) ≥ ϕt(e0, a) ≥ a, ∀t = 1, ..., T (a, ε). The
above inequalities imply that ∀t = 1, ..., T (a, ε):
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn , k∗Tn) > k
s − 2ε > a.
By definition:
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn , k∗Tn) = k
∗
Tn+T (a,ε) > a.
By Lemma 8 we have: ¯¯¯
ϕT (a,ε)(e0, k∗Tn+T (a,ε))− ks ¯¯¯ < ε.
The uniform continuity of ϕ implies that:¯¯¯
ϕ(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε))− ϕ(e0, k∗Tn+T (a,ε))¯¯¯ < ε.
As before we have that ∀t = 1, ..., T (a, ε)
ϕt(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) > a− ε
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) > k
s − 2ε > a.
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Observe that
ϕt(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) = ϕ
T (a,ε)+t(ζTn , k∗Tn) = k
∗
Tn+T (a,ε)+t,
in which case we have:
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε, ∀t = 1, ..., 2T (a, ε).
Repeating the above argument one can establish that :
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε, ∀t = 1, ...∞.
The claim is true for
γ = min{k∗1, ..., k∗Tn , a− ε}
Proposition 9 Let k0 > 0 and ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) be the solution to problem (P ).
Let ((csi , l
s
i )i∈I1 , k
s) denote the steady state associated with problem ( bQ). Then,
i) k∗t → ks, ii) c∗i,t → 0 and l∗i,t → 0, ∀i ∈ I2, iii) c∗i,t → csi and l∗i,t → lsi , ∀i ∈ I1.
Proof : Given Propositions 6,7 and 8, the proof of (i) parallels the one pre-
sented in Le Van-Vailakis (2003, Proposition 4). Since k∗t → ks there exists
some T such that (k∗t , k
∗
t+1) ∈ intD, ∀t ≥ T. We know that for any i ∈ I,
ci(ζt, k∗t , k
∗
t+1) and li(ζ
t, k∗t , k
∗
t+1) are continuous functions in [0, 1]
#I2 × intD
and that V (λ, ζt, k∗t , k
∗
t+1)→ bV (λ, ks, ks). This proves claims (ii) and (iii).
Remark 3 The last proposition shows that the equilibrium paths associated
with problem (P ) converge to a limit point. This limit point is the steady state
associated with the planner’s problem involving only the most patient consumers.
The model exhibits the well known property of "the emergence of a dominant
consumer" found in the seminal papers of Becker (1980) and Bewley (1982).
After all, one can ask if the convergence point is itself a steady state. It is easy
to show that this is not true.
Let k0 = ks and for any ∀t ≥ 1 assume that k∗t = ks and c∗i,t = csi , l∗i,t = lsi ,
∀i ∈ I1, c∗i,t = 0, l∗i,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I2. Assume that there exists j ∈ I with βj < β.
Since 0 < ks < f(ks,m), from Proposition 2(iiib) we have that c∗j,t > 0, l
∗
j,t > 0,
∀t ≥ 0. This in turn contradicts the optimality of k∗t = ks and c∗i,t = csi , l∗i,t = lsi ,
∀i ∈ I1.
It follows that in case where agents have diﬀerent discount factors and the
economy starts at k0 = ks any optimal path (k∗t ) converges to k
s with k∗1 6= ks.
As a result, the optimal path may exhibit fluctuations at least for the beginning
periods.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 6: Let k0 > 0 but assume that k∗1 = 0. Feasibility implies
that c∗i,t = 0, l
∗
i,t ∈ [0, 1], ∀i,∀t ≥ 1, k∗t = 0, ∀t ≥ 1. Since f(k0, L∗0) > 0 there
exists some j ∈ I such that c∗j,0 > 0. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Assume that l∗j,1 = 1.
Choose ε > 0 such that c∗j,0 > ε. Consider the alternative feasible path (c, l,k),
defined as follows:
i) cj,0 = c∗j,0 − ε, cj,1 = f(ε, L1), cj,t = c∗j,t, ∀t ≥ 2, lj,t = l∗j,t, ∀t ≥ 0
ii) ci,t = c∗i,t and li,t = l
∗
i,t, ∀i 6= j,∀t
iii) k1 = ε, kt = k∗t , ∀t ≥ 2
Define:
∆ε =
mX
i=1
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t)−
mX
i=1
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t).
The concavity of u and f implies that
∆ε = u
j(cj,0, lj,0)− uj(c∗j,0, l∗j,0) + β
£
uj(cj,1, lj,1)− uj(c∗j,1, l∗j,1)
¤
≥ ujc(cj,0, lj,0)(cj,0 − c∗j,0) + βujc(cj,1, 1)cj,1
= −ujc(cj,0, lj,0)ε+ βujc(cj,1, 1)f (ε, L1)
≥ ε
£
βujc(cj,1, 1)(1− δ)− ujc(cj,0, lj,0)
¤
.
As ε → 0, cj,1 → 0 and ujc(cj,1, 1) → +∞, while uc(cj,0, lj,0) → uc(c∗j,0, l∗j,0) <
+∞. Hence, for ε > 0 small enough, ∆ε > 0: a contradiction. It follows that
k∗1 > 0.
Case 2: Assume that l∗j,1 < 1.
Consider the alternative feasible path (c, l,k) described in case 1 with the only
diﬀerence that lj,1 ∈ (l∗j,1, 1]. Following the same argument we obtain that k∗1 >
0.
An induction argument proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 7: Assume the contrary: k0 > 0 and k∗ is optimal with
k∗t → 0. Observe that feasibility implies that c∗i,t → 0, ∀i. Since fk(0, 1) > 1
for k small enough, we have that f(k,m) > k. This implies that there exists
a date T, such that, 0 < k∗t+1 < f(k
∗
t ,m), ∀t ≥ T. We know that with any
optimal solution k∗ of problem (Q), there exist associated sequences (c∗i , l
∗
i )i
for consumption and leisure, such that, ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) is a solution to problem
(P ). For any t ≥ T there exists i ∈ I such that c∗i,t > 0, l∗i,t ∈ (0, 1). Observe
that L∗t = m−
P
i∈I l
∗
i,t. The proof follows in two steps:
Step 1: We claim that the sequence
³
k∗t
L∗t
´
converges to zero.
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Let
³
k∗tn
L∗tn
´
be a subsequence such that:
lim sup
t
k∗t
L∗t
= lim
n
k∗tn
L∗tn
.
Without loss of generality assume that 0 < k∗tn+1 < f(k
∗
tn ,m), ∀n. One can find
a sequence of consumers denoted by (in)n, such that, c∗in,tn > 0, l
∗
in,tn ∈ (0, 1)
and limn c∗in,tn = 0, limn l
∗
in,tn = l ∈ [0, 1].
Assume that (in)n is such that limn l∗in,tn = l ∈ [0, 1). This implies that there
exists some agent i ∈ I such that lim l∗i,tn = li ∈ [0, 1). In this case, L
∗
tn → L > 0
which proves the claim.
Consider next the case where for any sequence (in)n we have limn l∗in,tn = 1.
Observe that in this case, limn l∗i,tn = 1, ∀i ∈ I and L
∗
tn → 0.
The first order conditions for problem (P ) imply that ∀i ∈ I, ∀n :
FL
¡
k∗tn , L
∗
tn
¢
≤
uil(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
uic(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
.
Define ξ (x) = F (x, 1)− xFk (x, 1) . Since f is homogeneous of degree a ∈ (0, 1]
we have:
FLk
∗
tn , L
∗
tn) = a(L
∗
tn)
a−1ξ
µ
k∗tn
L∗tn
¶
≤
uil(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
uic(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
.
Taking the limits on both sides as n→ +∞ we get:
lim
n
FL
¡
k∗tn , L
∗
tn
¢
≤ u
i
l(0, 1)
uic(0, 1)
= 0.
For this to be true we must have:
ξ
µ
lim
n
k∗tn
L∗tn
¶
= 0.
Since ξ is increasing, there exists M > 0, such that,
k∗tn
L∗tn
≤ M, ∀n. If k
∗
tn
L∗tn
→
z > 0, from the definition of ξ and the strict concavity of F it follows that
ξ (z) = F (z, 1)− zFk (z, 1) > 0 : a contradiction. Therefore, limn
k∗tn
L∗tn
= 0.
Step 2: Choose some ε > 0, such that, fk(ε, 1) > 1mini βi . Since k
∗
t → 0 and
k∗t
L∗tn
→ 0, there exists some date T 0 , such that, k∗t ≤ ε and
k∗t
L∗t
≤ ε, ∀t ≥ T 0 .
For any t ≥ T1 = max{T, T 0} Euler’s equations hold, i.e.
uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) = βiu
i
c(c
∗
i,t+1, l
∗
i,t+1)fk
¡
k∗t+1, L
∗
t+1
¢
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Observe that fk
¡
k∗t+1, L
∗
t+1
¢
≥ fk (ε, 1) , t ≥ T1. It follows that there exists
T2 ≥ T1 such that for any t ≥ T2:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)
t−T2Y
τ=1
∙µ
min
i
βi
¶
fk
¡
k∗t+τ , L
∗
t+τ
¢¸
≥ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)
t−T2Y
τ=1
∙µ
min
i
βi
¶
fk (ε, 1)
¸
≥ At−T2uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t).
with A = (mini βi) fk (ε, 1) > 1. Fix some i ∈ I. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Assume that uicl ≤ 0.
In this case, ∀t > T2 we have:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ At−T2uic(c∗i,t, 1).
Since limtAt−T2 = +∞, c∗i,t → 0 and ui satisfies the Inada conditions, we obtain
that At−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, 1)→ +∞ : a contradiction.
Case 2: Assume that uicl > 0.
In this case, ∀t > T2 we have:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)
Since limtAt−T2 = +∞, it follows that uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t) → 0. Given that c∗i,t → 0
and ui satisfies the Inada conditions, we have that l∗i,t → 0. Observe also that
∀t > T2 we have:
uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) = u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)fL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
≤ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)f
µ
k∗t
L∗t
, 1
¶
≤ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)f (ε, 1)
This implies that uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)→ 0.
Since by assumption ui(0, 0) = 0, we have to distinguish three subcases.
1) Assume first that there exists ec > 0 such that ui(ec, 0) > 0.
In this case, there exists c > 0 such that uic(c, 0) > 0 (if not, then u
i
c(c, 0) = 0,
∀c > 0 and ui(ec, 0) > 0 : a contradiction). Since c∗i,t → 0, there exists T3 ≥ T2,
such that, ∀t > T3 we have c∗i,t < c:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T3uic(c
∗
i,t, 0) ≥ At−T2uic(c, 0)
Since limtAt−T2 = +∞, taking the limits on both sides we obtain a contradic-
tion.
2) Consider next the case where there exists el > 0 such that ui(0,el) > 0.
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A similar argument implies that there exists l such that uil(0, l) > 0. Since
l∗i,t → 0, there exists T3 ≥ T2 such that ∀t > T3 we have l∗i,t < l and
uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ uil(0, l∗i,t) ≥ uil(0, l) > 0.
Taking the limits on both sides as t→ +∞ we obtain a contradiction.
3) Consider finally the case where ui(c, 0) = ui(0, l) = 0, ∀c,∀l.
We know that c∗i,t → 0 and l∗i,t → 0. Observe that for any subsequence
of (c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t)t such that c
∗
i,t < l
∗
i,t, assumption U5 implies that u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥
uic(l
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ uic(1, 1) > 0 : a contradiction since we know that uic(l∗i,t, l∗i,t) → 0.
In a similar way, for any subsequence of (c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t)t such that c
∗
i,t > l
∗
i,t, as-
sumption U5 implies that uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ uil(c∗i,t, c∗i,t) ≥ uil(A(k0), A(k0)) > 0 : a
contradiction since we know that uil(l
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)→ 0.
27
References
[1] Becker A. R.: On the long-run steady state in a simple dynamic model
of equilibrium with heterogeneous households, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 95, 375-383 (1980).
[2] Becker A. R. : An example of optimal growth with heterogeneous agents
and twisted turnpike, Indiana University unpublished manuscript.(2005).
[3] Becker A. R. and Foias C.: A characterization of Ramsey equilibrium,
Journal of Economic Theory, 41, 173-184 (1987).
[4] Becker A. R. and Foias C.: The local bifurcation of Ramsey equilibrium,
Economic Theory, 4, 719-744 (1994).
[5] Bewley, T.F.: An Integration of Equilibrium Theory and Turnpike Theory,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 233-267 (1982).
[6] Dechert, W.D. and Nishimura K.: A complete characterization of opti-
mal growth paths in an aggregative model with a no-concave production
function, Journal of Economic Theory, 31, 332-354 (1985).
[7] Florenzano, M., Le Van, C. and Gourdel, P.: Finite Dimensional and Op-
timization, Studies in Economic Theory 13, Springer-Verlag 2001.
[8] Le Van, C. and L. Morhaim (2002), "Optimal growth models with bounded
or unbounded returns: A unifying approach", Journal of Economic Theory
105, 158-187.
[9] Le Van, C. and Vailakis Y.: Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one-
sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment,
Economic Theory, 22, 743-771 (2003).
[10] Majumdar, Mukul, Mitra, T. and Nishimura K.: Optimization and chaos,
Studies in Economic Theory 11, Springer-Verlag 2000.
[11] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. and Green R.J.: Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford University Press 1995.
[12] Mitra, T.: On optimal economic growth with variable discount rates: Ex-
istence and stability results, International Economic Review, 20, 133-145
(1979).
[13] Sorger, G.: One the structure of Ramsey equilibrium: Cycles, Indetermi-
nacy and Sunspots, Economic Theory, 4, 745-764 (1994).
28
[14] Stokey, N. and Lucas Jr., R.E. with Prescott, E.C.: Recursive Methods in
Economic Dynamics. Harvard University Press 1989.
29
